Thành viên:NguoiDungKhongDinhDanh/Rối loạn đa nhân cách

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Rối loạn đa nhân cách
Tên khácRối loạn nhân cách phân liệt[1][2]
Khoa/NgànhKhoa tâm thần
Triệu chứngCó tối thiểu 2 nhân cách, không nhớ các sự kiện xảy ra[3]
Biến chứngTự sát, tự hại[3]
Diễn biếnDài hạn
Nguyên nhânSang chấn thời thơ ấu, liệu pháp tâm lý[4]
Phương pháp chẩn đoánDựa theo các tiêu chí lâm sàng
Chẩn đoán phân biệtTrầm cảm, rối loạn lưỡng cực, rối loạn stress sau sang chấn, loạn tâm thần, rối loạn sử dụng chất gây nghiện, động kinh, rối loạn nhân cách[3]
Điều trịĐiều trị triệu chứng, Tâm lý trị liệu
Dịch tễ~2% dân số[3][5]

Rối loạn đa nhân cách (tiếng Anh: DID - Dissociative identity disorder) hay còn được gọi là rối loạn nhân dạng phân ly,[6] là một dạng rối loạn tâm thần được đặc trưng bằng ít nhất hai nhân cách khác biệt và tồn tại tương đối lâu ở người bệnh.[3] Triệu chứng thường đi kèm với bệnh mất trí nhớ tâm lý vượt xa so với sự lãng trí thông thường.[3] Những nhân cách này thay phiên thể hiện trong hành vi của một người;[3] tuy nhiên nhân cách nào xuất hiện còn tùy thuộc vào từng trường hợp.[4] Các vấn đề khác thường xảy ra ở những người mắc DID bao gồm rối loạn nhân cách ranh giới (BPD), hậu chấn tâm lý (PTSD), trầm cảm, rối loạn sử dụng chất, tự gây hại, và lo lắng.[3][4]

Một số chuyên gia tin rằng nguyên nhân của bệnh này là chấn thương từ thời thơ ấu.[7] Trong khoảng 90% các trường hợp, người bệnh đã từng bị lạm dụng khi còn bé, trong khi các trường hợp còn lại nguyên nhân có liên quan đến chiến tranh hoặc các vấn đề sức khỏe khi còn nhỏ.[3] Yếu tố di truyền cũng được cho là một yếu tố liên quan.[4] Một giả thuyết khác cho rằng nó là tác dụng phụ của các kỹ thuật được sử dụng bởi một số nhà trị liệu, đặc biệt là những nhà trị liệu sử dụng thuật thôi miên.[4][8] Không nên kết luận bệnh nhân bị bệnh này nếu tình trạng của người bệnh được giải thích tốt hơn bởi sự lạm dụng chất gây nghiện, co giật, trẻ em chơi trò chơi tưởng tượng, hoặc thực hành tôn giáo.[3]

Những cách điều trị thường bao gồm chăm sóc hỗ trợ và tâm lý trị liệu.[7] Tình trạng bệnh thường bị kéo dài nếu không được điều trị.[7][9] Bệnh được cho là ảnh hưởng đến khoảng 1,5% trên tổng dân số và 3% đối với những người nhập viện tâm thần ở Châu Âu và Bắc Mỹ.[3][5] Bệnh này ở nữ giới nhiều gấp sáu lần so với nam giới.[4] Số lượng các trường hợp DID tăng đáng kể trong nửa sau của thế kỷ 20, cùng với số lượng nhân cách ở bệnh nhân cũng tăng đáng kể.[4]

Rối loạn đa nhân cách là bệnh gây tranh cãi trong cả tâm thần học và hệ thống pháp luật.[4][8] Trong các vụ kiện tòa án, bệnh này ít khi được sử dụng để bào chữa thành công bệnh nhân tâm thần.[10][11] Không rõ liệu tỷ lệ bệnh này gia tăng là do xã hội nhận biết tốt hơn về bệnh này hay do các yếu tố văn hóa xã hội ví dụ như cách truyền thông mô tả bệnh này.[4] Phần lớn các ca rối loạn đa nhân cách được chẩn đoán bởi một số ít bác sĩ lâm sàng, điều này trùng khớp với giả thuyết cho rằng bệnh này có thể do chính nhà trị liệu tâm lý gây ra.[4] Các triệu chứng điển hình của bệnh này có thể có sự khác biệt khi so sánh các khu vực khác nhau trên thế giới tùy thuộc vào cách bệnh rối loạn đa nhân cách được các phương tiện truyền thông mô tả ví dụ như phim.[4]

Định nghĩa

Phân ly là từ chuyên môn làm cơ sở để chẩn đoán các loại bệnh rối loạn phân ly bao gồm DID. Từ này không có định nghĩa khoa học chính xác được đồng thuận rộng rãi.[12][13][14] Một số lượng lớn các triệu chứng được chẩn đoán phân ly là bao gồm từ sự mất tập trung bình thường cho tới sự suy nhược trí nhớ thường thấy ở các bệnh rối loạn phân ly. Do đó hiện tại không rõ là nếu như có một nguyên nhân chung cho tất cả các chịu chứng phân ly hoặc nếu như các chịu chứng từ nhẹ tới nặng là hậu quả của các nguyên căn và cấu trúc sinh học khác nhau.[12] Các từ chuyên môn khác như nhân cách, trạng thái nhân cách, bản sắc, trạng thái cái tôi, và trạng thái mất trí nhớ cũng không có định nghĩa được thống nhất.[13][15] Có một số mô hình chẩn đoán bệnh bao gồm những triệu chứng không thuộc loại phân ly và loại bỏ một số triệu chứng phân ly.[13] Mô hình chẩn đoán được phổ biến rộng rãi nhất xem DID là trạng thái cực đoan của trạng thái phân ly. Còn mô hình dòng chảy để giải thích trạng thái phân ly thì vẫn còn gây tranh cãi.[14]

Một số từ ngữ mới được tạo ra để mô tả những hiện tượng trong trạng thái phân liệt. Nhà tâm thần học Paulette Gillig giải thích sự khác biệt giữa hai từ được sử dụng nhiều trong các thảo luận về bệnh DID là "trạng thái cái tôi" (ego state) và "nhân cách". Trạng thái cái tôi là những hành vi và trải nghiệm có thể trộn lẫn với những trạng thái cái tôi khác nhưng chỉ có một cái tôi duy nhất, và mỗi nhân cách đều có bộ trí nhớ khác nhau, khả năng tư duy riêng biệt, và mỗi nhân cách tự nhận mình là một người khác nhau. Ellert Nijenhuis và các đồng nghiệp đưa ra giả thuyết là có sự khác biệt giữa "nhân cách bình thường" (nhân cách thường thấy hàng ngày) và "nhân cách cảm xúc" (nhân cách này xuất hiện khi có phản ứng chiến hay chạy, ký ức chấn thương mãnh liệt, và cảm xúc đau đớn).[16] Otto van der Hart và các đồng nghiệp tạo ra từ mới "cấu trúc phân ly của nhân cách" để mô tả trạng thái phân ly do các sự kiện chấn thương hoặc bệnh lý gây ra. Cấu trúc phân ly được chia ra làm ba bậc. Bậc một bao gồm một nhân cách bình thường và một nhân cách cảm xúc. Bậc hai bao gồm một nhân cách bình thường và ít nhất hai nhân cách cảm xúc. Bậc ba bao gồm ít nhất hai nhân cách bình thường và hai nhân cách cảm xúc. Theo thuyết này thì DID thuộc cấu trúc bậc ba.[12] Một số nhà tâm thần học khác đưa ra giả thuyết rằng trạng thái phân ly có thể chia thành hai hình thái riêng biệt, vô cảm và chia ngăn. Trạng thái chia ngăn là sự mất kiểm soát những quá trình hoặc hành động tự chủ thường thấy ở bệnh DID. Các nghiên cứu để phân biệt trạng thái phân ly bình thường và phân liệt bệnh lý vẫn chưa được cộng đồng tâm thần học chấp nhận rộng rãi.[12]

Signs and symptoms

Thành viên:NguoiDungKhongDinhDanh/Rối loạn đa nhân cách/Dấu hiệu và triệu chứng

Causes

General

DID is aetiologically complex.[17][18] Şar et al. state, "Dissociative identity disorder (DID) is multifactorial in its etiology. Whereas psychosocial etiologies of DID include developmental traumatization and sociocognitive sequelae, biological factors include trauma-generated neurobiological responses. Biologically derived traits and epigenetic mechanisms are also likely to be at play. At this point, no direct examination of genetics has occurred in DID. However, it is likely to exist, given the genetic link to dissociation in general and in relation to childhood adversity in particular."[19] Stating that there is "a lack of understanding regarding the etiopathology of DID", Blihar adds that "many researchers and psychiatrists regard DID as the most severe form of a childhood onset post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) because it is virtually impossible to find a DID patient without a history of PTSD [...]. There are currently two competing theories regarding the relationship between trauma and dissociation: the trauma-related model and the fantasy-prone model."[18]

According to an October 2020 editorial within the British Journal of Psychology titled "Dissociative Identity Disorder: Out of the Shadows at Last" the authors explain why the fantasy prone model continues to persist despite evidence against it:

"Although the trauma versus fantasy debate has evolved and aetiological research has broadened in the past few decades, there are several reasons why the fantasy model continues to appeal to clinicians. One reason is that information in undergraduate and graduate textbooks about trauma and dissociation is inadequate or simply wrong, because (a) it is often based on experimental research in non-clinical samples, (b) it is not fully based on scientific research, (c) it contains unbalanced discussions about the detrimental impact of childhood traumatisation and (d) it disregards empirical evidence showing a relationship between dissociation and antecedent trauma. Another reason is reluctance to accept the nature and severity of childhood abuse that individuals with DID report. It is troubling and painful to acknowledge how common and devastating trauma is, especially chronic childhood abuse. Subconscious protective mechanisms can take over to deny the reality of such abuse and to believe that DID is a factitious disorder, as stated by the fantasy model.1 However, it becomes increasingly apparent that severe childhood abuse, neglect and maltreatment are part of many psychiatric disorders and of our society."

The DSM-5 diagnostic manual states that DID is "associated with overwhelming experiences, traumatic events, and/or abuse during childhood".[3]:294 Other risk factors reported include childhood neglect, childhood medical procedures, war, terrorism, and childhood prostitution.[3]:295 Dissociative disorders frequently occur after trauma, and the DSM5 places them after the trauma and stressor-related disorders to reflect this close relationship.[3]:291 Disturbed and altered sleep has also been suggested as having a role in dissociative disorders in general and specifically in DID, alterations in environments also largely affecting the DID patient.[20]

Developmental trauma

Bài chi tiết: Trauma model of mental disorders

People diagnosed with DID often report that they have experienced physical or sexual abuse during childhood;[21] others report overwhelming stress, serious medical illness or other traumatic events during childhood.[21] They also report more historical psychological trauma than those diagnosed with any other mental illness.[22] Severe sexual, physical, or psychological trauma in childhood has been proposed as an explanation for its development; awareness, memories and emotions of harmful actions or events caused by the trauma are removed from consciousness, and alternate personalities or subpersonalities form with differing memories, emotions and behavior.[23] DID is attributed to extremes of stress or disorders of attachment. What may be expressed as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in adults may become DID when occurring in children, possibly due to their greater use of imagination as a form of coping.[24] Possibly due to developmental changes and a more coherent sense of self past the age of six, the experience of extreme trauma may result in different, though also complex, dissociative symptoms and identity disturbances.[24] A specific relationship between childhood abuse, disorganized attachment, and lack of social support are thought to be a necessary component of DID.[25][cần nguồn thứ cấp] 

Although what role a child's biological capacity to dissociate to an extreme level remains unclear, some evidence indicates a neurobiological impact of developmental stress.[19]

According to Richard J. Loewenstein, MD in the Department of Psychiatry, University of Maryland School of Medicine "Controversy about dissociation and the dissociative disorders (DD) has existed since the beginning of modern psychiatry and psychology. Even among professionals, beliefs about dissociation/DD often are not based on the scientific literature. Multiple lines of evidence support a powerful relationship between dissociation/DD and psychological trauma, especially cumulative and/or early life trauma. Skeptics counter that dissociation produces fantasies of trauma, and that DD are artefactual conditions produced by iatrogenesis and/or socio-cultural factors. Almost no research or clinical data support this view. DD are common in general and clinical populations and represent a major underserved population with a substantial risk for suicidal and self-destructive behavior. Prospective treatment outcome studies of severely ill DD patients show significant improvement in symptoms including suicidal/self-destructive behaviors, with reductions in treatment cost. A major public health effort is needed to raise awareness about dissociation/DD, including educational efforts in all mental health training programs and increased funding for research." ["Dissociation Debates: Everything You Know is Wrong," Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience

Therapist-induced

The prevailing post-traumatic model of dissociation and dissociative disorders has historically been contested and are remnants of out-dated hypotheses that became popular in the 1980s (such as the fantasy-model and therapy-induced model). Loewenstein, 2018

In the therapist-induced model, it has been hypothesized that symptoms of DID may be created by therapists using techniques to "recover" memories (such as the use of hypnosis to "access" alter identities, facilitate age regression or retrieve memories) on suggestible individuals.[15][26][27][28][29] Referred to as the "sociocognitive model" (SCM), it proposes that DID is due to a person consciously or unconsciously behaving in certain ways promoted by cultural stereotypes,[27] with unwitting therapists providing cues through improper therapeutic techniques. This model posits that behavior is enhanced by media portrayals of DID.[30]

Proponents of the SCM note that dissociative symptoms are rarely present before intensive therapy by specialists in the treatment of DID who, through the process of eliciting, conversing with and identifying alters, shape or possibly create the diagnosis. While proponents note that DID is accompanied by genuine suffering and the distressing symptoms, and can be diagnosed reliably using the DSM criteria, they are skeptical of the traumatic etiology suggested by proponents.[31]

Psychologist Nicholas Spanos and others have suggested that in addition to therapy caused cases, DID may be the result of role-playing rather than alternative identities, though others disagree, pointing to a lack of incentive to manufacture or maintain separate identities and point to the claimed histories of abuse.[32] Other arguments that therapy can cause DID, include the lack of children diagnosed with DID, the sudden spike in rates of diagnosis after 1980 (although DID was not a diagnosis until DSM-IV, published in 1994), the absence of evidence of increased rates of child abuse, the appearance of the disorder almost exclusively in individuals undergoing psychotherapy, particularly involving hypnosis, the presences of alternate identities (such as those claiming to be animals or mythological creatures) and an increase in the number of alternate identities over time[30][15] (as well as an initial increase in their number as psychotherapy begins in DID-oriented therapy[30]). These various cultural and therapeutic causes occur within a context of pre-existing psychopathology, notably borderline personality disorder, which is commonly comorbid with DID.[30] In addition, presentations can vary across cultures, such as Indian patients who only switch alters after a period of sleep — which is commonly how DID is presented by the media within that country.[30]

Proponents of psychotherapy as a cause of DID state that DID is linked to (possibly suggestive) psychotherapy, often involving recovered memories (memories that the person previously had amnesia for) or false memories, and that such therapy could cause additional identities. Such memories could be used to make an allegation of child sexual abuse. There is little agreement between those who see therapy as a cause and trauma as a cause.[8] Supporters of therapy as a cause of DID suggest that a small number of clinicians diagnosing a disproportionate number of cases would provide evidence for their position[27] though it has also been claimed that higher rates of diagnosis in specific countries like the United States may be due to greater awareness of DID. Lower rates in other countries may be due to artificially low recognition of the diagnosis.[26] However, false memory syndrome per se is not regarded by mental health experts as a valid diagnosis,[33] and has been described as "a non-psychological term originated by a private foundation whose stated purpose is to support accused parents,"[34] and critics argue that the concept has no empirical support, and further describe the False Memory Syndrome Foundation as an advocacy group that has distorted and misrepresented memory research.[35][36]

"False-Memory Syndrome as a clinical construct has never been operationalized, studied, or validated."[37]

Children

Because DID is rarely diagnosed in children, it is cited as a reason to doubt the validity of DID,[15][27] and proponents of both etiologies believe that the discovery of DID in a child that had never undergone treatment would critically undermine the SCM. Conversely, if children are found to only develop DID after undergoing treatment it would challenge the traumagenic model.[27] Tính đến năm 2011, approximately 250 cases of DID in children have been identified, though the data does not offer unequivocal support for either theory. While children have been diagnosed with DID before therapy, several were presented to clinicians by parents who were themselves diagnosed with DID; others were influenced by the appearance of DID in popular culture or due to a diagnosis of psychosis due to hearing voices — a symptom found similarly in DID.

According to Wilkinson and Dejong (2020) "Dissociation is a common and often overlooked symptom in traumatised children. Although there is a lack of a scientific consensus as to the nature of dissociation and very limited research about dissociative identity disorder (DID) in children...repeated traumatic experiences of an interpersonal nature can have a profound effect on a child's identity, memory and self-organisation. Furthermore, abuse and neglect can increase the risk of dissociative symptoms."[38] An article published in 2019 investigating 68 children whose mothers has emotional dysregulation, supports that early childhood dissociation can be identified and measured using the Child Behavioral Checklist and showed moderate stability in childhood dissociation between the timepoints when the children were 3–4 years old and again at 5–6 years old [39]

Possible explanations for a lack of DID diagnoses in children are that children are still developing their personalities and learning to cope with their living conditions and the manifestation of DID takes time and ongoing conditions while the brain is developing. It is also clear that DID is not well understood by many clinicians and the ability to diagnose DID in a child is much more difficult. But, dissociation is clearly one mechanism children use for coping and serves as an initial mechanism for its etiology. Research is converging on understanding the combinations of stress hormones, brain development, coping mechanisms, extent and length of abuse, and when abuse occurred during childhood stages.

Pathophysiology

Emerging brain research on DID is demonstrating there are distinct differences in the brains of people diagnosed with DID. Explanations for these differences stem from the hypothesis that the etiology of DID comes from persistent and severe trauma that occurs during childhood when the brain and the personality are developing.

Enough brain imaging research has occurred in this area to support systematic reviews of the medical literature, and these systematic reviews are concluding there are structural differences between the brains of people with DID, people with PTSD only, and healthy controls (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S246874992030017X)(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5422461/).

In fact, differences in the brain between healthy controls and people diagnosed with DID are significant enough that a computer can distinguish with 73% accuracy the difference between the controls and the DID patient (https://neurosciencenews.com/ai-did-brain-10312/). According to Dr Simone Reinders, Senior Research Associate at the Department of Psychological Medicine, Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, King’s College London, “The findings of our present study are important because they provide the first evidence of a biological basis for distinguishing between individuals with DID and healthy individuals. Ultimately, the application of pattern recognition techniques could prevent unnecessary suffering through earlier and more accurate diagnosis, facilitating faster and more targeted therapeutic interventions.”

Diagnosis

General

The fifth, revised edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) diagnoses DID according to the diagnostic criteria found under code 300.14 (dissociative disorders). DID is often initially misdiagnosed because clinicians receive little training about dissociative disorders or DID, and often use standard diagnostic interviews that do not include questions about trauma, dissociation or post-traumatic symptoms.[5]:118 This contributes to difficulties diagnosing the disorder and clinician bias.[5]

The criteria require that an individual be recurrently controlled by two or more discrete identities or personality states, accompanied by memory lapses for important information that is not caused by alcohol, drugs or medications and other medical conditions such as complex partial seizures.[3] In children the symptoms must not be better explained by "imaginary playmates or other fantasy play".[3] Diagnosis is normally performed by a clinically trained mental health professional such as a psychiatrist or psychologist through clinical evaluation, interviews with family and friends, and consideration of other ancillary material. Specially designed interviews (such as the SCID-D) and personality assessment tools may be used in the evaluation as well.[40] People are often disinclined to seek treatment, especially since their symptoms may not be taken seriously; thus dissociative disorders have been referred to as "diseases of hiddenness".[41][42]

The condition may be under-diagnosed due to skepticism and lack of awareness from mental health professionals, made difficult due to the lack of specific and reliable criteria for diagnosing DID as well as a lack of prevalence rates due to the failure to examine systematically selected and representative populations.[28][43]

The Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) and the Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule are two techniques currently used to diagnose DID. A recent meta-analysis of studies using the DES showed that the DES is capable of distinguishing between dissociative disorders and other conditions:

"The largest mean dissociation scores were found in dissociative disorders (mean scores >35), followed by posttraumatic stress disorder, borderline personality disorder, and conversion disorder (mean scores >25). Somatic symptom disorder, substance-related and addictive disorders, feeding and eating disorders, schizophrenia, anxiety disorder, OCD, and most affective disorders also showed mean dissociation scores >15. Bipolar disorders yielded the lowest dissociation scores (mean score, 14.8)."[44]

The new brain-based research and indications of measurable and significant changes in the brains of people with DID is introducing the concept of diagnosis using MRI, PET scans, and other brain imaging techniques, however this may be a very expensive way to diagnose DID.[45]

Research published in 2019 has shown the ability of the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) to accurately differentiate between individuals with clinical dissociative identity disorder (DID) and students coached on malingering DID. The TOMM research "demonstrated high specificity (87%) and positive predictive power (94%), as well as moderate sensitivity (78%), negative predictive power (63%), and overall diagnostic power (81%)."[46]

Differential diagnoses

People with DID are diagnosed with five to seven comorbid disorders on average—much higher than other mental illnesses.[25][cần nguồn thứ cấp]


Due to overlapping symptoms, the differential diagnosis includes schizophrenia, normal and rapid-cycling bipolar disorder, epilepsy, borderline personality disorder, and autism spectrum disorder.[47] Delusions or auditory hallucinations can be mistaken for speech by other personalities.[24] Persistence and consistency of identities and behavior, amnesia, measures of dissociation or hypnotizability and reports from family members or other associates indicating a history of such changes can help distinguish DID from other conditions. A diagnosis of DID takes precedence over any other dissociative disorders. Distinguishing DID from malingering is a concern when financial or legal gains are an issue, and factitious disorder may also be considered if the person has a history of help or attention-seeking. Individuals who state that their symptoms are due to external spirits or entities entering their bodies are generally diagnosed with dissociative disorder not otherwise specified rather than DID due to the lack of identities or personality states.[48] Most individuals who enter an emergency department and are unaware of their names are generally in a psychotic state. Those with DID generally have adequate reality testing; they may have positive Schneiderian symptoms of schizophrenia but lack the negative symptoms.[49] They perceive any voices heard as coming from inside their heads (patients with schizophrenia experience them as external).[12]

DID must be distinguished from, or determined if comorbid with, a variety of disorders including mood disorders, psychosis, anxiety disorders, PTSD, personality disorders, cognitive disorders, neurological disorders, epilepsy, somatoform disorder, factitious disorder, malingering, other dissociative disorders, and trance states.[50] An additional aspect of the controversy of diagnosis is that there are many forms of dissociation and memory lapses, which can be common in both stressful and nonstressful situations and can be attributed to much less controversial diagnoses.[51] Individuals faking or mimicking DID due to factitious disorder will typically exaggerate symptoms (particularly when observed), lie, blame bad behavior on symptoms and often show little distress regarding their apparent diagnosis. In contrast, genuine people with DID typically exhibit confusion, distress and shame regarding their symptoms and history.[50]

A relationship between DID and borderline personality disorder has been posited, with various clinicians noting overlap between symptoms and behaviors and it has been suggested that some cases of DID may arise "from a substrate of borderline traits". Reviews of DID patients and their medical records concluded that the majority of those diagnosed with DID would also meet the criteria for either borderline personality disorder or more generally borderline personality.[25][cần nguồn thứ cấp]


The DSM-5 elaborates on cultural background as an influence for some presentations of DID.[3]:295

Many features of dissociative identity disorder can be influenced by the individual's cultural background. Individuals with this disorder may present with prominent medically unexplained neurological symptoms, such as non-epileptic seizures, paralyses, or sensory loss, in cultural settings where such symptoms are common. Similarly, in settings where normative possession is common (e.g., rural areas in the developing world, among certain religious groups in the United States and Europe), the fragmented identities may take the form of possessing spirits, deities, demons, animals, or mythical figures. Acculturation or prolonged intercultural contact may shape the characteristics of other identities (e.g., identities in India may speak English exclusively and wear Western clothes). Possession-form dissociative identity disorder can be distinguished from culturally accepted possession states in that the former is involuntary, distressing, uncontrollable, and often recurrent or persistent; involves conflict between the individual and his or her surrounding family, social, or work milieu; and is manifested at times and in places that violate the norms of the culture or religion.

Controversy

DID has been amongst the most controversial of the dissociative disorders and among the most controversial disorders found in the DSM-5.[52][12][18] The primary dispute is between those who believe DID is caused by traumatic stresses forcing the mind to split into multiple identities, each with a separate set of memories,[53][13] and the belief that the symptoms of DID are produced artificially by certain psychotherapeutic practices or patients playing a role they believe appropriate for a person with DID.[28][29][41][32][49]

Modern research supports the trauma-induced model.[54] According to Say, et al. "Given the current evidence, DID as a diagnostic entity cannot be explained as a phenomenon created by iatrogenic influences, suggestibility, malingering, or social role-taking. On the contrary, DID is an empirically robust chronic psychiatric disorder based on neurobiological, cognitive, and interpersonal non-integration as a response to unbearable stress."[55]

Screening

Perhaps due to their perceived rarity, the dissociative disorders (including DID) were not initially included in the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID), which is designed to make psychiatric diagnoses more rigorous and reliable.[13] Instead, shortly after the publication of the initial SCID a freestanding protocol for dissociative disorders (SCID-D)[56] was published.[13] This interview takes about 30 to 90 minutes depending on the subject's experiences.[57] An alternative diagnostic instrument, the Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule, also exists but the SCID-D is generally considered superior.[13] The Dissociative Disorders Interview Schedule (DDIS) is a highly structured interview that discriminates among various DSM-IV diagnoses. The DDIS can usually be administered in 30–45 minutes.[58]

Other questionnaires include the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES), Perceptual Alterations Scale, Questionnaire on Experiences of Dissociation, Dissociation Questionnaire, and the Mini-SCIDD. All are strongly intercorrelated and except the Mini-SCIDD, all incorporate absorption, a normal part of personality involving narrowing or broadening of attention.[13] The DES[59] is a simple, quick, and validated[60] questionnaire that has been widely used to screen for dissociative symptoms, with variations for children and adolescents. Tests such as the DES provide a quick method of screening subjects so that the more time-consuming structured clinical interview can be used in the group with high DES scores. Depending on where the cutoff is set, people who would subsequently be diagnosed can be missed. An early recommended cutoff was 15–20.[61] The reliability of the DES in non-clinical samples has been questioned.[62][cần nguồn thứ cấp]


Treatment

Treatment aims to increase integrated functioning.[5] The International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation has published guidelines for phase-oriented treatment in adults as well as children and adolescents that are widely used in the field of DID treatment.[63][5] The guidelines state that "a desirable treatment outcome is a workable form of integration or harmony among alternate identities". Some experts in treating people with DID use the techniques recommended in the 2011 treatment guidelines.[63] The empirical research includes the longitudinal TOP DD treatment study, which found that patients showed "statistically significant reductions in dissociation, PTSD, distress, depression, hospitalisations, suicide attempts, self-harm, dangerous behaviours, drug use and physical pain" and improved overall functioning.[63] Treatment effects have been studied for over thirty years, with some studies having a follow-up of ten years.[63] Adult and child treatment guidelines exist that suggest a three-phased approach,[5] and are based on expert consensus.[63][5] Highly experienced therapists have few patients that achieve a unified identity.[64] Common treatment methods include an eclectic mix of psychotherapy techniques, including cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT),[5][25] insight-oriented therapy,[13] dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT), hypnotherapy and eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR). Medications can be used for comorbid disorders or targeted symptom relief, for example antidepressants or treatments to improve sleep.[5][41] Some behavior therapists initially use behavioral treatments such as only responding to a single identity, and then use more traditional therapy once a consistent response is established.[65][Cần cập nhật] Brief treatment due to managed care may be difficult, as individuals diagnosed with DID may have unusual difficulties in trusting a therapist and take a prolonged period to form a comfortable therapeutic alliance.[5] Regular contact (at least weekly) is recommended, and treatment generally lasts years—not weeks or months.[25][cần nguồn thứ cấp] 

Sleep hygiene has been suggested as a treatment option, but has not been tested. In general there are very few clinical trials on the treatment of DID, none of which were randomized controlled trials.[30]Bản mẫu:Disputed inline

Therapy for DID is generally phase oriented.[63] Different alters may appear based on their greater ability to deal with specific situational stresses or threats. While some patients may initially present with a large number of alters, this number may reduce during treatment—though it is considered important for the therapist to become familiar with at least the more prominent personality states as the "host" personality may not be the "true" identity of the patient. Specific alters may react negatively to therapy, fearing the therapist's goal is to eliminate the alter (particularly those associated with illegal or violent activities). A more realistic and appropriate goal of treatment is to integrate adaptive responses to abuse, injury or other threats into the overall personality structure.[25][cần nguồn thứ cấp] 

There is debate over issues such as whether exposure therapy (reliving traumatic memories, also known as abreaction), engagement with alters and physical contact during therapy are appropriate and there are clinical opinions both for and against each option with little high-quality evidence for any position.[cần dẫn nguồn]

Brandt et al., commenting on the lack of empirical studies of treatment effectiveness, conducted a survey of 36 clinicians expert in treating dissociative disorder (DD) who recommended a three-stage treatment. They agreed that skill building in the first stage is important so the patient can learn to handle high risk, potentially dangerous behavior, as well as emotional regulation, interpersonal effectiveness and other practical behaviors. In addition, they recommended "trauma-based cognitive therapy" to reduce cognitive distortions related to trauma; they also recommended that the therapist deal with the dissociated identities early in treatment. In the middle stage, they recommended graded exposure techniques, along with appropriate interventions as needed. The treatment in the last stage was more individualized; few with DD [sic] became integrated into one identity.[64]

The first phase of therapy focuses on symptoms and relieving the distressing aspects of the condition, ensuring the safety of the individual, improving the patient's capacity to form and maintain healthy relationships, and improving general daily life functioning. Comorbid disorders such as substance use disorder and eating disorders are addressed in this phase of treatment.[5] The second phase focuses on stepwise exposure to traumatic memories and prevention of re-dissociation. The final phase focuses on reconnecting the identities of disparate alters into a single functioning identity with all its memories and experiences intact.[5]

A study was conducted to develop an "expertise-based prognostic model for the treatment of complex post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and dissociative identity disorder (DID)". Researchers constructed a two-stage survey and factor analyses performed on the survey elements found 51 factors common to complex PTSD and DID. The authors concluded from their findings: "The model is supportive of the current phase-oriented treatment model, emphasizing the strengthening of the therapeutic relationship and the patient's resources in the initial stabilization phase. Further research is needed to test the model's statistical and clinical validity."[66]

A less well known, but promising treatment approach for DID is the Developmental Needs Meeting Strategy.[67]

Prognosis

Little is known about prognosis of untreated DID.[50] It rarely, if ever, goes away without treatment,[68][21] but symptoms may resolve from time to time[68] or wax and wane spontaneously.[21] Patients with mainly dissociative and post-traumatic symptoms face a better prognosis than those with comorbid disorders or those still in contact with abusers, and the latter groups often face lengthier and more difficult treatment. Suicidal ideation, failed suicide attempts, and self-harm also occur.[21] Duration of treatment can vary depending on patient goals, which can range from merely improving inter-alter communication and cooperation, to reducing inter-alter amnesia, to integration of all alters, but generally takes years.[21]

Epidemiology

General

In the past clinicians thought, or were taught to believe, that DID and dissociation in general is a rare disorder that is the result of horrific or otherwise traumatic events and experiences.[5][52] They may also view it as consisting of "florid, dramatic presentation."[5] Beidel et al. state, "Population prevalence estimates vary widely, from extremely rare [...] to rates approximating that of schizophrenia [...] Estimates of DID inpatients settings range from 1-9.6%."[12] Reported rates in the community vary from 1% to 3% with higher rates among psychiatric patients.[5][26] Şar et al. state, "Studies conducted in various countries led to a consensus about prevalences of DID: 3–5% among psychiatric inpatients, 2–3% among outpatients, and 1% in the general population. Prevalences appear heightened among adolescent psychiatric outpatients and in the psychiatric emergency unit."[19]

DID is 5 to 9 times more common in females than males during young adulthood, although this may be due to selection bias as males who could be diagnosed with DID may end up in the criminal justice system rather than hospitals.[12]

In children, rates among females and males are approximately the same (5:4).[68] DID diagnoses are extremely rare in children; much of the research on childhood DID occurred in the 1980s and 1990s and does not address ongoing controversies surrounding the diagnosis.[27] DID occurs more commonly in young adults[69] and declines with age.[70]

Although the condition has been described in non-English speaking nations and non-Western cultures, these reports all occur in English-language journals authored by international researchers who cite Western scientific literature and are therefore not isolated from Western influences.[27]

Changing prevalence

Rates of diagnosed DID were increasing, reaching a peak of approximately 40,000 cases by the end of the 20th century, up from less than 200 before 1970.[68][12] Initially DID along with the rest of the dissociative disorders were considered the rarest of psychological conditions, numbering less than 100 by 1944, with only one further case added in the next two decades.[13] In the late 1970s and 80s, the number of diagnoses rose sharply.[13] An estimate from the 1980s places the incidence at 0.01%.[68] Accompanying this rise was an increase in the number of alters, rising from only the primary and one alter personality in most cases, to an average of 13 in the mid-1980s (the increase in both number of cases and number of alters within each case are both factors in professional skepticism regarding the diagnosis).[13] Others explain the increase as being due to the use of inappropriate therapeutic techniques in highly suggestible individuals, though this is itself controversial[28][32] while proponents of DID claim the increase in incidence is due to increased recognition of and ability to recognize the disorder.[12] Figures from psychiatric populations (inpatients and outpatients) show a wide diversity from different countries.[71]

North America

The DSM-5 estimates the prevalence of DID at 1.5% based on a "small community study." Dissociative disorders were excluded from the Epidemiological Catchment Area Project.

DID is a controversial diagnosis and condition, with much of the literature on DID still being generated and published in North America, to the extent that it was once regarded as a phenomenon confined to that continent[29][72] though research has appeared discussing the appearance of DID in other countries and cultures.[73] A 1996 essay offered three possible causes for the sudden increase in people diagnosed with DID:[74][cần nguồn thứ cấp]

  1. The result of therapist suggestions to suggestible people, much as Charcot's hysterics acted in accordance with his expectations.
  2. Psychiatrists' past failure to recognize dissociation being redressed by new training and knowledge.
  3. Dissociative phenomena are actually increasing, but this increase only represents a new form of an old and protean entity: "hysteria".

Paris believes that the first possible cause is the most likely.[cần dẫn nguồn] Etzel Cardena and David Gleaves believe the over-representation of DID in North America is the result of increased awareness and training about the condition which had formerly been missing.[26]

History

Early references

One of ten photogravure portraits of Louis Vivet published in Variations de la personnalité by Henri Bourru and Prosper Ferdinand Burot

The first described case of DID was thought to be by Paracelsus in 1646.[10][Còn mơ hồ – thảo luận] In the 19th century, "dédoublement," or double consciousness, the historical precursor to DID, was frequently described as a state of sleepwalking, with scholars hypothesizing that the patients were switching between a normal consciousness and a "somnambulistic state".[20]

An intense interest in spiritualism, parapsychology and hypnosis continued throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries,[72] running in parallel with John Locke's views that there was an association of ideas requiring the coexistence of feelings with awareness of the feelings.[75][cần nguồn thứ cấp] 

Hypnosis, which was pioneered in the late 18th century by Franz Mesmer and Armand-Marie Jacques de Chastenet, Marques de Puységur, challenged Locke's association of ideas. Hypnotists reported what they thought were second personalities emerging during hypnosis and wondered how two minds could coexist.[72]
The plaque on the former house of Pierre Marie Félix Janet (1859–1947), the philosopher and psychologist who first alleged a connection between events in the subject's past life and present mental health, also coining the words "dissociation" and "subconscious"

In the 19th century, there were a number of reported cases of multiple personalities which Rieber[75][cần nguồn thứ cấp] 

estimated would be close to 100. Epilepsy was seen as a factor in some cases,[75][cần nguồn thứ cấp]
and discussion of this connection continues into the present era.[76][77]

By the late 19th century, there was a general acceptance that emotionally traumatic experiences could cause long-term disorders which might display a variety of symptoms.[78] These conversion disorders were found to occur in even the most resilient individuals, but with profound effect in someone with emotional instability like Louis Vivet (1863–?), who suffered a traumatic experience as a 17-year-old when he encountered a viper. Vivet was the subject of countless medical papers and became the most studied case of dissociation in the 19th century.

Between 1880 and 1920, various international medical conferences devoted time to sessions on dissociation.[79] It was in this climate that Jean-Martin Charcot introduced his ideas of the impact of nervous shocks as a cause for a variety of neurological conditions. One of Charcot's students, Pierre Janet, took these ideas and went on to develop his own theories of dissociation.[80] One of the first individuals diagnosed with multiple personalities to be scientifically studied was Clara Norton Fowler, under the pseudonym Christine Beauchamp; American neurologist Morton Prince studied Fowler between 1898 and 1904, describing her case study in his 1906 monograph, Dissociation of a Personality.[80][81]

20th century

In the early 20th century, interest in dissociation and multiple personalities waned for several reasons. After Charcot's death in 1893, many of his so-called hysterical patients were exposed as frauds, and Janet's association with Charcot tarnished his theories of dissociation.[72] Sigmund Freud recanted his earlier emphasis on dissociation and childhood trauma.[72]

In 1908, Eugen Bleuler introduced the term "schizophrenia" to represent a revised disease concept for Emil Kraepelin's dementia praecox.[82] Whereas Kraepelin's natural disease entity was anchored in the metaphor of progressive deterioration and mental weakness and defect, Bleuler offered a reinterpretation based on dissociation or "splitting' (Spaltung) and widely broadened the inclusion criteria for the diagnosis. A review of the Index medicus from 1903 through 1978 showed a dramatic decline in the number of reports of multiple personality after the diagnosis of schizophrenia became popular, especially in the United States.[83] The rise of the broad diagnostic category of dementia praecox has also been posited in the disappearance of "hysteria" (the usual diagnostic designation for cases of multiple personalities) by 1910.[84] A number of factors helped create a large climate of skepticism and disbelief; paralleling the increased suspicion of DID was the decline of interest in dissociation as a laboratory and clinical phenomenon.[79]

Starting in about 1927, there was a large increase in the number of reported cases of schizophrenia, which was matched by an equally large decrease in the number of multiple personality reports.[79] With the rise of a uniquely American reframing of dementia praecox/schizophrenia as a functional disorder or "reaction" to psychobiological stressors—a theory first put forth by Adolf Meyer in 1906—many trauma-induced conditions associated with dissociation, including "shell shock" or "war neuroses" during World War I, were subsumed under these diagnoses.[82] It was argued in the 1980s that DID patients were often misdiagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia.[79]

The public, however, was exposed to psychological ideas which took their interest. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and many short stories by Edgar Allan Poe, had a formidable impact.[75][cần nguồn thứ cấp]


The Three Faces of Eve

In 1957, with the publication of the bestselling book The Three Faces of Eve by psychiatrists Corbett H. Thigpen and Hervey M. Cleckley, based on a case study of their patient Chris Costner Sizemore, and the subsequent popular movie of the same name, the American public's interest in multiple personality was revived. More cases of dissociative identity disorder were diagnosed in the following years.[85] The cause of the sudden increase of cases is indefinite, but it may be attributed to the increased awareness, which revealed previously undiagnosed cases or new cases may have been induced by the influence of the media on the behavior of individuals and the judgement of therapists.[85] During the 1970s an initially small number of clinicians campaigned to have it considered a legitimate diagnosis.[79]

History in the DSM

The DSM-II used the term Hysterical Neurosis, Dissociative Type. It described the possible occurrence of alterations in the patient's state of consciousness or identity, and included the symptoms of "amnesia, somnambulism, fugue, and multiple personality".[86] The DSM-III grouped the diagnosis with the other four major dissociative disorders using the term "multiple personality disorder". The DSM-IV made more changes to DID than any other dissociative disorder,[26] and renamed it DID.[48] The name was changed for two reasons. First, the change emphasizes the main problem is not a multitude of personalities, but rather a lack of a single, unified identity[26] and an emphasis on "the identities as centers of information processing".[24] Second, the term "personality" is used to refer to "characteristic patterns of thoughts, feelings, moods and behaviors of the whole individual", while for a patient with DID, the switches between identities and behavior patterns is the personality.[26] It is for this reason the DSM-IV-TR referred to "distinct identities or personality states" instead of personalities. The diagnostic criteria also changed to indicate that while the patient may name and personalize alters, they lack independent, objective existence.[26] The changes also included the addition of amnesia as a symptom, which was not included in the DSM-III-R because despite being a core symptom of the condition, patients may experience "amnesia for the amnesia" and fail to report it.[24] Amnesia was replaced when it became clear that the risk of false negative diagnoses was low because amnesia was central to DID.[26]

The ICD-10 places the diagnosis in the category of "dissociative disorders", within the subcategory of "other dissociative (conversion) disorders", but continues to list the condition as multiple personality disorder.[6]

The DSM-IV-TR criteria for DID have been criticized for failing to capture the clinical complexity of DID, lacking usefulness in diagnosing individuals with DID (for instance, by focusing on the two least frequent and most subtle symptoms of DID) producing a high rate of false negatives and an excessive number of DDNOS diagnoses, for excluding possession (seen as a cross-cultural form of DID), and for including only two "core" symptoms of DID (amnesia and self-alteration) while failing to discuss hallucinations, trance-like states, somatoform, depersonalization, and derealization symptoms. Arguments have been made for allowing diagnosis through the presence of some, but not all of the characteristics of DID rather than the current exclusive focus on the two least common and noticeable features.[24] The DSM-IV-TR criteria have also been criticized [cần dẫn nguồn] for being tautological, using imprecise and undefined language and for the use of instruments that give a false sense of validity and empirical certainty to the diagnosis.

The DSM-5 updated the definition of DID in 2013, summarizing the changes as:[87]

Several changes to the criteria for dissociative identity disorder have been made in DSM-5. First, Criterion A has been expanded to include certain possession-form phenomena and functional neurological symptoms to account for more diverse presentations of the disorder. Second, Criterion A now specifically states that transitions in identity may be observable by others or self-reported. Third, according to Criterion B, individuals with dissociative identity disorder may have recurrent gaps in recall for everyday events, not just for traumatic experiences. Other text modifications clarify the nature and course of identity disruptions.

Between 1968 and 1980, the term that was used for dissociative identity disorder was "Hysterical neurosis, dissociative type." The APA wrote in the second edition of the DSM: "In the dissociative type, alterations may occur in the patient's state of consciousness or in his identity, to produce such symptoms as amnesia, somnambulism, fugue, and multiple personality."[86] The number of cases sharply increased in the late 1970s and throughout the 80s, and the first scholarly monographs on the topic appeared in 1986.[13]

Sybil

In 1974, the highly influential book Sybil was published, and later made into a miniseries in 1976 and again in 2007. Describing what Robert Rieber called "the third most famous of multiple personality cases,"[88][cần nguồn thứ cấp] 

it presented a detailed discussion of the problems of treatment of "Sybil Isabel Dorsett," a pseudonym for Shirley Ardell Mason. Though the book and subsequent films helped popularize the diagnosis and trigger an epidemic of the diagnosis,[51] later analysis of the case suggested different interpretations, ranging from Mason's problems having been caused by the therapeutic methods used by her psychiatrist, Cornelia B. Wilbur, or an inadvertent hoax due in part to the lucrative publishing rights,[88][cần nguồn thứ cấp]

[89][cần nguồn thứ cấp] 

though this conclusion has itself been challenged.[90] Dr. David Spiegel, a Stanford psychiatrist whose father treated Shirley Ardell Mason on occasion, says that his father described Mason as "a brilliant hysteric. He felt that Dr. Wilbur tended to pressure her to exaggerate on the dissociation she already had."[91] [cần nguồn tốt hơn] As media attention on DID increased, so too did the controversy surrounding the diagnosis.[10]

Re-classifications

With the publication of the DSM-III, which omitted the terms "hysteria" and "neurosis" (and thus the former categories for dissociative disorders),[cần dẫn nguồn] dissociative diagnoses became "orphans" with their own categories[92] with dissociative identity disorder appearing as "multiple personality disorder."[13] In the opinion of McGill University psychiatrist Joel Paris, this inadvertently legitimized them by forcing textbooks, which mimicked the structure of the DSM, to include a separate chapter on them and resulted in an increase in diagnosis of dissociative conditions. Once a rarely occurring spontaneous phenomenon (research in 1944 showed only 76 cases),[93] became "an artifact of bad (or naïve) psychotherapy" as patients capable of dissociating were accidentally encouraged to express their symptoms by "overly fascinated" therapists.[92]

In a 1986 book chapter (later reprinted in another volume), philosopher of science Ian Hacking focused on multiple personality disorder as an example of "making up people" through the untoward effects on individuals of the "dynamic nominalism" in medicine and psychiatry. With the invention of new terms entire new categories of "natural kinds" of people are assumed to be created, and those thus diagnosed respond by re-creating their identity in light of the new cultural, medical, scientific, political and moral expectations. Hacking argued that the process of "making up people" is historically contingent, hence it is not surprising to find the rise, fall, and resurrection of such categories over time.[94] Hacking revisited his concept of "making up people" in an article published in the London Review of Books on 17 August 2006.[95]

"Interpersonality amnesia" was removed as a diagnostic feature from the DSM III in 1987, which may have contributed to the increasing frequency of the diagnosis.[13] There were 200 reported cases of DID as of 1980, and 20,000 from 1980 to 1990.[96] Joan Acocella reports that 40,000 cases were diagnosed from 1985 to 1995.[97] Scientific publications regarding DID peaked in the mid-1990s then rapidly declined.[98]

There were several contributing factors to the rapid decline of reports of multiple personality disorder/dissociative identity disorder. One was the discontinuation in December 1997 of Dissociation: Progress in the Dissociative Disorders, the journal of The International Society for the Study of Multiple Personality and Dissociation.[99] The society and its journal were perceived as uncritical sources of legitimacy for the extraordinary claims of the existence of intergenerational satanic cults responsible for a "hidden holocaust"[100] of Satanic ritual abuse that was linked to the rise of MPD reports. In an effort to distance itself from the increasing skepticism regarding the clinical validity of MPD, the organization dropped "multiple personality" from its official name in 1993, and then in 1997 changed its name again to the International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation.

In 1994, the fourth edition of the DSM replaced the criteria again and changed the name of the condition from "multiple personality disorder" to the current "dissociative identity disorder" to emphasize the importance of changes to consciousness and identity rather than personality. The inclusion of interpersonality amnesia helped to distinguish DID from dissociative disorder not otherwise specified (DDNOS), but the condition retains an inherent subjectivity due to difficulty in defining terms such as personality, identity, ego-state and even amnesia.[13] The ICD-10 classified DID as a "Dissociative [conversion] disorder" and used the name "multiple personality disorder" with the classification number of F44.81.[6] In the ICD-11, the World Health Organization have classified DID under the name "dissociative identity disorder" (coded as 6B64), and most cases formerly diagnosed as DDNOS are classified as "partial dissociative identity disorder" (coded as 6B65).[101]

21st century

A 2006 study compared scholarly research and publications on DID and dissociative amnesia to other mental health conditions, such as anorexia nervosa, alcohol use disorder, and schizophrenia from 1984 to 2003. The results were found to be unusually distributed, with a very low level of publications in the 1980s followed by a significant rise that peaked in the mid-1990s and subsequently rapidly declined in the decade following. Compared to 25 other diagnosis, the mid-1990s "bubble" of publications regarding DID was unique. In the opinion of the authors of the review, the publication results suggest a period of "fashion" that waned, and that the two diagnoses "[did] not command widespread scientific acceptance."[98]

Society and culture

General

The public's long fascination with DID has led to a number of different books and films,[5]:169 with many representations described as increasing stigma by perpetuating the myth that people with mental illness are usually dangerous.[102] Movies about DID have been also criticized for poor representation of both DID and its treatment, including "greatly overrepresenting" the role of hypnosis in therapy,[103] showing a significantly smaller number of personalities than many people with DID have,[104][103][105] and misrepresenting people with DID as having flamboyant and obvious personalities.[106] Some movies are parodies and ridicule DID, for instance Me, Myself & Irene, which also incorrectly states that DID is schizophrenia.[107] In some stories DID is used as a plot device, e.g. in Fight Club, and in whodunnit stories like Secret Window.[108][107]

Total Drama: Revenge of the Island had a character named Mike, who had suffered DID. Split character Kevin Wendell Crumb suffered DID and had 24 different personalities.

The United States of Tara was reported to be the first US television series with Dissociative Identity Disorder as its focus, and a professional commentary on each episode was published by the International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation.[109][110] More recently, the award winning Korean TV series Kill Me, Heal Me (Tiếng Hàn: 킬미, 힐미; Romaja: Kilmi, Hilmi) featured a wealthy young man with seven personalities, one of who falls in love with the beautiful psychiatry resident who tries to help him.[111][112]

Most people with DID are believed to downplay or minimize their symptoms rather than seeking fame, often due to fear of the effects of stigma, or shame.[5][113] Therapists may discourage them from media work due to concerns that they may feel exploited or traumatized, for example as a result of demonstrating switching between personality states for entertainment.[5]:169

However, a number of people with DID have publicly spoken about their experiences including comedian and talk show host Roseanne Barr, who interviewed Truddi Chase, author of When Rabbit Howls; Chris Costner Sizemore, the subject of The Three Faces of Eve, Cameron West, author of First Person Plural: My Life as a Multiple, and NFL player Herschel Walker, author of Breaking Free: My Life with Dissociative Identity Disorder.[104][114]

In The Three Faces of Eve (1957) hypnosis is used to identify a childhood trauma which then allows the her to merge from three identities into just one.[103] However, Sizemore's own books I'm Eve and A Mind of My Own revealed that this did not last; she later attempted suicide, sought further treatment, and actually had twenty-two personalities rather than three.[103][105] Sizemore re-entered therapy and by 1974 had achieved a lasting recovery.[103] Voices Within: The Lives of Truddi Chase portrays many of the ninety-two personalities Chase described in her book When Rabbit Howls, and is unusual in breaking away from the typical ending of integrating into one.[106][107] Frankie and Alice (2010), starring Halle Berry; and the TV mini-series Sybil were also based on real people with DID.[108] In popular culture dissociative identity disorder is often confused with schizophrenia,[115] and some movies advertised as representing dissociative identity disorder may be more representative of psychosis or schizophrenia, for example Psycho (1960).[102][108]

In his book The C.I.A. Doctors: Human Rights Violations by American Psychiatrists, psychiatrist Colin A. Ross states that based on documents obtained through freedom of information legislation, a psychiatrist linked to Project MKULTRA reported being able to deliberately induce dissociative identity disorder using a variety of aversive or abusive techniques, creating a Manchurian Candidate for military purposes.[116][117]

Legal issues

People with dissociative identity disorder may be involved in legal cases as a witness, defendant, or as the victim/injured party. In the United States dissociative identity disorder has previously been found to meet the Frye test as a generally accepted medical condition, and the newer Daubert standard.[118][119] Within legal circles, DID has been described as one of the most disputed psychiatric diagnoses and forensic assessments are needed.[8] For defendants whose defense states they have a diagnosis of DID, courts must distinguish between those who genuinely have DID and those who are malingering to avoid responsibility, as shown in the fictional book and film Primal Fear.[118][8] Expert witnesses are typically used to assess defendants in such cases,[10] although some of the standard assessments like the MMPI-2 were not developed for people with a trauma history and the validity scales may incorrectly suggest malingering.[120] The Multiscale Dissociation Inventory (Briere, 2002) is well suited to assessing malingering and dissociative disorders, unlike the self-report Dissociative Experiences Scale.[120] In DID, evidence about the altered states of consciousness, actions of alter identities and episodes of amnesia may be excluded from a court if they not considered relevant, although different countries and regions have different laws.[10] A diagnosis of DID may be used to claim a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, but this very rarely succeeds, or of diminished capacity, which may reduce the length of a sentence.[11][119] DID may also affect competency to stand trial.[121] A not guilty by reason of insanity plea was first used successfully in an American court in 1978, in the State of Ohio v. Milligan case.[11] However, a DID diagnosis is not automatically considered a justification for an insanity verdict, and since Milligan the few cases claiming insanity have largely been unsuccessful.[11]

DID may be present in witnesses or victims of crime. In Australia in 2019 a woman with DID testified against her abusive father, with several of her personality states testifying separately about him abusing her in childhood, which he admitted.[122]

Rights movement

In the context of neurodiversity, the experience of dissociative identities has been called multiplicity[123] and has led to advocacy such as the recognition of positive plurality and the use of plural pronouns such as "we" and "our".[104][124] Liz Fong-Jones states the fear those with this condition might have in regard to "coming out" about their DID or plurality, as it could put them in a vulnerable position.[125]

In particular, advocates have challenged the necessity of integration.[126][127] Timothy Baynes suggests that forcing people to integrate is immoral, arguing that alters have full moral status, just as their host does. And that it may entail the (involuntary) elimination of an entity with full moral status.[128]

A well established DID (or Dissociative Identities) Awareness Day takes place on March 5 annually, and a multicolored awareness ribbon is used, based on the idea of a "crazy quilt".[129][130][131]

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